

BOARD FOR BRANCH PILOTS MEETING

MINUTES

The Virginia Board for Branch Pilots met on Wednesday, May 5, 2003, at the Virginia Port Authority, 600 World Trade Center, Norfolk, Virginia, with the following members present:

Captain Robert H. Callis, III
Bruce R. Cherry
Captain J. William Cofer
Captain Milton B. Edmunds
Robert T. Hasler, Jr.
Edgar A. Massenburg
Captain W. Hugh McCrory, Jr.
P. Warren Spratley, Jr.
Meade G. Stone, Jr.

Staff present for the meeting were:

Louise Fontaine Ware, Director
Mark N. Courtney, Executive Director
Marian H. Brooks, Program Administrator

Richard B. Zorn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, was present at the meeting.

Finding a quorum of the Board present, Mr. Hasler, President, called the meeting to order at 10:04 a.m. Call to Order

Judge Massenburg moved to approve the agenda as amended. Mr. Spratley seconded the motion which was unanimously approved by Messrs. and Captains: Callis, Cherry, Cofer, Edmunds, Hasler, Massenburg, McCrory, Spratley, and Stone. Approval of Agenda

Mr. Cherry moved to approve the minutes from the February 5, 2003, Board meeting as amended. Captain Callis seconded the motion which was unanimously approved by Messrs. and Captains: Callis, Cherry, Cofer, Edmunds, Hasler, Massenburg, McCrory, Spratley, and Stone. Approval of Minutes

The Board reviewed a letter from Captain Jonathan D. Worth dated February 28, 2003, regarding an incident involving the M/V STAR DAVANGER. Captain Jonathan D. Worth - M/V STAR DAVANGER

Captain Worth was ordered to sail the Singapore flagged vessel M/V

STAR DAVANGER at 2330 on February 24, 2003, which was berthed at Elizabeth River Terminals (ERT) #2 on the Southern Branch of the Elizabeth River. The vessel was moored port side to the pier. The vessel's particulars are: 600 feet length; 102 feet beam; and 53 feet, 6 inches molded depth. The vessel had a forward draft of 29 feet, 6 inches and an after draft of 33 feet, 5 inches. The wind was out of the Northwest at approximately 5 to 10 knots with good visibility. The current was flooding at approximately ½ knot.

There was a vessel at ERT #1 and at the International Matex Tank Terminal (IMTT). In order to exit the branch, the M/V STAR DAVANGER had to be backed past both vessels with the aid of tugs to the turning basin at Money Point. Once at Money Point, there was sufficient room to turn the vessel and continue the transit out of the Southern Branch.

Captain Worth had a Master/Pilot exchange when the Captain of the vessel arrived on the bridge. Upon review of the pilot card and Captain Worth's conversations with the mate and Captain, Captain Worth noted the vessel's length over all, breadth, depth, drafts fore and aft, maneuvering speeds, speed/RPM ratio and tonnage. The vessel had 1.5 degrees of gyro error. Captain Worth noted the engine horsepower to be 13,300. The vessel had a right-handed fixed propeller with a balanced streamline rudder. The vessel was not fitted with a bow thruster. The Captain informed Captain Worth that everything was in good working order. Captain Worth signed his Master/Pilot exchange card and gave it to the Captain.

Captain Worth called the Joint Harbor Operations Control (JHOC) and gave them a required 30 minute notice before getting underway. The JHOC cleared the vessel for transit to Cape Henry at about 2315.

The docking master, John Morey, boarded the vessel shortly after Captain Worth boarded. Docking master Morey took the conn of the vessel and made the tugs TOWN POINT and CAPE COD fast on the bow and stern, respectively. All lines were ordered to let go at about 0010. Captain Worth made a security call at this time to inform any traffic in the area of their intentions. There was no response. The docking master and the Captain of the vessel were working side by side on the port bridge wing. The Captain was relaying the orders from the dock master to his mate inside the bridge via a hand-held radio. The docking master maneuvered the vessel away from the pier and positioned it in the middle of the stream.

By approximately 0030, the docking master had positioned the vessel in the middle of the river. The M/V STAR DAVANGER, whose speed was

1.5 knots astern, was on a dead slow astern bell. The tug TOWN POINT had been made up on the bow with a line through the bull-nose since the undocking. The tug CAPE COD had been made up on the starboard quarter since the undocking. The situation was normal.

At approximately 0034, the docking master had ordered the engine to stop. The speed of the vessel was 1.5 knots astern. The docking master continued on course for a while longer so as to not get the vessel close to the bank on the vessel's port side. The docking master was using the tug CAPE COD on the starboard side to anticipate kicking the stern to the center of the channel. Captain Worth indicated that it was evident that the docking master was using the tug TOWN POINT during the maneuver as he observed the tug moving from the starboard to the port bow and vice versa. The situation was still normal.

At approximately 0039, the docking master had ordered the rudder hard right and engines slow ahead to keep the vessel in the center of the channel. Within the span of one minute, the engine was ordered to half then full ahead. The vessel's speed was approximately 1-1.5 knots astern. The tug CAPE COD was pushing on the starboard quarter at full speed. The situation was still normal. The full ahead ordered in conjunction with the tugs working should have been sufficient to "kick" the stern of the vessel toward the center of the channel. Captain Worth indicated that this was standard procedure for this situation.

At approximately 0041, the rudder was still hard right and the engine was ordered to full ahead. The vessel's speed was approximately ½ to 1 knot astern. Captain Worth positioned himself on the starboard bridge wing to watch the vessel's progress in respect to the M/V PERSEVERANCE. The M/V STAR DAVANGER was not reacting as anticipated to the full ahead order. Captain Worth noticed that the propeller wash did not look normal for a vessel turning at full speed ahead. Captain Worth observed that the wash should have been much more pronounced than it appeared. The RPM indicator on the starboard bridge wing was reading 70 RPM, 20 RPM less than the posted RPM inside the bridge and on the pilot card. The posted speed/RPM table indicated the following:

Full	90 RPM	
Half	75 RPM	← <i>Actual: 70 RPM</i>
Slow	65 RPM	
Dead Slow	55 RPM	

Captain Worth immediately ran across to the port bridge wing and informed the Captain and the docking master. The Captain informed Captain Worth that everything was normal. Captain Worth pointed to the port bridge wing indicator and told him the vessel was not turning for full ahead RPM's. The Captain ran in the bridge and soon returned. The Captain told Captain Worth and the docking master that the full ahead was 85 RPM and not 90 as posted. Captain Worth again pointed out to the Captain the deficiency in the RPM and asked if the 3 indicators that Captain Worth observed were working properly. The Captain said that everything was in working order. The RPM's remained at 70, and Captain Worth indicated the Captain seemed unconcerned. During Captain Worth's attempts to inform the Captain of the deficiency, the rubber fender-work of the tug CAPE COD made contact with the M/V PERSEVERANCE.

At approximately 0045, the engines had remained at 70 RPM for approximately 3 to 4 minutes. The fender-work of the tug CAPE COD slid along the hull of the M/V PERSEVERANCE for approximately 75 feet. The two vessels never made contact. The thrust on the propeller eventually kicked the M/V STAR DAVANGER's stern away from the M/V PERSEVERANCE. Docking master Morey repositioned the vessel in the middle of the river. The vessel continued toward the turning area at Money Point. During the turning maneuvers at Money Point, the RPM's remained 10-15 less than those posted. Captain Worth again confronted the Captain about the deficiency, and Captain Worth indicated that the Captain's attitude was unassuming and he admitted nothing wrong with the vessel.

Captain Worth took the conn from the docking master at approximately 0230 as the vessel exited the Southern Branch and approached Town Point Reach. Captain Worth was ordered to anchor the vessel at Sewell's Point by the United States Coast Guard Captain of the Port. By the time that Captain Worth took the conn of the vessel, it was nearly running at the posted RPM's.

Attached to the information submitted by Mr. Worth was a copy of the bell book and the pilot card, signed and dated by the Captain of the vessel, which included the speed/RPM table. Captain Worth indicated that the information in the bell book is correct, with two exceptions. Captain Worth stated that he boarded the vessel at 2310 and the docking master boarded the vessel at 2325. The bell log indicated that they both arrived at the same time, which is not correct. Also, when anchoring, Captain Worth ordered the engine half ahead with a hard left rudder before he

backed the vessel. Captain Worth's anchoring maneuvers are not correctly indicated in the bell book.

Captain Worth stated that it is his contention that the Captain of the vessel needed to inform him and the docking master of the RPM discrepancies before sailing. The docking master anticipated the reduced RPM's for the remainder of the trip and maneuvered the vessel out of the branch without further incident.

Mr. Cherry moved that the letter be filed and that the Board take no action as there appears to be no violation of the Board's rules, regulations, or statutes. Mr. Stone seconded the motion which was unanimously approved by Messrs. and Captains: Callis, Cherry, Cofer, Edmunds, Hasler, Massenburg, McCrory, Spratley, and Stone.

The Board reviewed a letter from Captain Nathaniel T. Green, II, dated March 19, 2003, regarding an incident involving the M/V PRESTIGE ACE.

**Captain Nathaniel
T. Green - M/V
PRESTIGE ACE**

On Thursday, March 13, 2003, Captain Green was the state pilot on the M/V PRESTIGE ACE from Cape Henry to Newport News Pier C. Captain Green's orders were to go starboard side to (bow in) on the north side of the pier. Captain Green boarded the vessel at Cape Henry at 2015. It was a clear, mild night with light winds. Captain Green informed the Captain of his orders and that a change in weather condition could be expected during the transit as a strong cold front was moving into the area. After conducting a Master/Pilot exchange, Captain Green was informed by the Captain that the vessel was in good order. The vessel proceeded to Newport News.

The M/V PRESTIGE ACE is a wheelhouse forward Car Carrier 656 feet in length, 106 feet on the beam, with a molded depth of 112 feet. The vessel's deep draft was 28 feet, 9 inches and the vessel was equipped with a bow thruster rated at 1200 horsepower.

When the vessel met its two tugs off Newport News at around 2220, there was an ebb current and north-northeast winds at 20-30 knots with higher gusts. The docking master came aboard and introduced himself to the Captain, and asked about the vessel. After an information exchange, the docking master took control of the vessel between the Dominion Terminal Associates (DTA) Terminal and Pier 9, kicked the engine ahead and proceeded towards the pier. The docking master informed Captain Green and the Captain that he planned to land the vessel against the face of the pier with the intentions of pivoting the vessel into the berth. Because of

the amount of wind set, the docking master called in a third tug as a safety measure.

The docking master then proceeded to land the vessel as planned and started to pivot the vessel into the berth. As he was doing this, the docking master asked the Captain to keep him informed as to distances from the bow to the southeast corner of Pier B. It appeared the bow would clear, but communication problems between the Captain, who was Korean, and the Chief Officer that was on deck, who was Filipino, prevented any accurate information from getting to the docking master. At this point, the Captain was so distracted in his efforts to communicate with the Chief Officer that engine orders were not being efficiently relayed from the docking master to the mate in the wheelhouse. Captain Green began relaying these orders to make sure they were being heard. The docking master ordered the engine astern to check the slight headway the vessel was starting to carry. It was difficult to determine from the confused conversation Captain Green was overhearing how the Captain ascertained that the vessel would "no clear" but he motioned with his hands for the docking master to keep backing the vessel. At approximately 2250, as the vessel moved astern, the side ramp on the starboard side of the vessel was damaged by the fender system on the northwest corner of Pier C. Neither the Captain nor the docking master was aware of any damage until the vessel's agent, who had witnessed the incident, came aboard.

Once ashore, the docking master and Captain Green assessed the damage, which appeared to be limited to a hinge and pin assembly and a thin piece of hard black fendering torn from the metal base of the pier fender. The docking master reported this to his office, and Captain Green told the dispatcher that there could be a delay in the scheduled sailing if repairs to the vessel were done at the pier. The vessel did sail the next day around the expected time.

Captain Green indicated that, in his opinion, the docking master did an excellent job of berthing the vessel in less than ideal conditions and believes there would not have been an incident had there not been communication problems.

Mr. Stone moved that the letter be filed and that the Board take no action as there appears to be no violation of the Board's rules, regulations, or statutes. Judge Massenburg seconded the motion which was unanimously approved by Messrs. and Captains: Callis, Cherry, Cofer, Edmunds, Hasler, Massenburg, McCrory, Spratley, and Stone.

The Board reviewed a letter from Captain Kevin D. Hartz, dated March 25, 2003, regarding an incident involving the M/V NOMAR.

Captain Kevin D.
Hartz - M/V
NOMAR

On Thursday, March 20, 2003, at 2300 hours, Captain Hartz was ordered to pilot the M/V NOMAR from Newport News Pier IX to Sewell's Point F anchorage. After anchoring, the M/V NOMAR was to receive bunkers for 2 hours and then proceed to sea. Captain Hartz was to remain onboard during the bunkering operation and then pilot the vessel to Cape Henry. The M/V NOMAR is a bulk carrier of 707 feet in length and a beam of 104 feet. The vessel's draft this night was 40 feet, 2 inches. The vessel is equipped with a single right hand turning fixed propeller and no bow thruster. The night was clear and the winds were southwest at 10-15 knots.

Before leaving Pier IX, Captain Hartz conferred with the Captain about the vessel and the anchoring maneuver. Captain Hartz signed both the Captain's pilot card, as well as his own Master/Pilot exchange card. Captain Hartz also set up his Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) unit. The undocking maneuver and transit to the anchorage proceeded without incident. When the vessel arrived in the "F" anchorage, the current was slack for the ebb. Once the vessel was anchored the Captain allowed Captain Hartz to rest in one of the spare cabins.

At 0430 on Friday, March 21, 2003, one of the mates on the vessel told Captain Hartz that the barge was completing the bunkering operation. Captain Hartz went up to the bridge to ascertain the vessel's status. The M/V NOMAR was laying for ebb current with the bow pointing to the southwest. The current at this time was one hour past maximum ebb with a predicted strength of 1.5 knots and a direction of 050 degrees. The weather was clear and the wind was from the southwest at approximately 10 knots.

During this time, Captain Hartz checked the 12245 chart and set up a danger bearing (230 degrees) and distance (1200 feet) from the Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel North Tunnel Island along the shoal water on the north side of the anchorage. Captain Hartz planned to use this bearing and distance on the radar with the DGPS unit to keep himself posted on the vessel's distance to the shoal water. Captain Hartz did this because he would have to turn the M/V NOMAR around from the southwest to the northeast in order to proceed to sea.

Since the M/V NOMAR is a right-handed, fixed motor vessel, Captain Hartz decided to turn the vessel around to the right. Captain Hartz wanted

to back to advantage, that is, use the vessel's tendency for the stern to go to port and the bow to starboard while the engine is running astern. Captain Hartz set up the danger bearing and two distances showing 600 and 1200 feet from the bow on the vessel's radar. Captain Hartz's intent was for the bow to remain more than 1200 feet from the danger bearing.

A short while later, the Captain arrived on the bridge, and he and Captain Hartz conferred about how Captain Hartz would turn the vessel around. Captain Hartz and the Captain agreed the vessel should be turned to the right and that once the anchor was clear, the first engine order would be an astern bell. The Captain then proceeded to weigh the anchor.

During the anchor maneuver the bridge team consisted of the Captain, a quartermaster at the helm, and Captain Hartz. While the mate on the bow heaved in on the anchor chain, the Captain conferred with him on the vessel's radio, in Russian, how the chain was leading. If the mate needed the vessel's heading changed, the Captain ordered rudder commands to the quartermaster, in Russian, and he operated the engine order telegraph himself. The helm orders varied from midships to hard starboard and he used kicks ahead and astern while heaving the anchor.

The Captain kept Captain Hartz posted, in English, on how many shots of chain were still in the water as the mate heaved in. After 15 to 20 minutes of heaving, the Captain relayed to Captain Hartz that the anchor was now clear of the water. At this time, the vessel was slow ahead and hard starboard. It was Captain Hartz's intention to take the conn, so he ordered stop engine and half astern. The Captain told Captain Hartz "no," he did not want to go astern, and that he wanted to continue with his ahead bell. At this time, the Captain did not turn over the navigation of the M/V NOMAR to Captain Hartz.

Captain Hartz checked the M/V NOMAR's position and believed that by still going ahead, they were not placing the vessel in danger. Captain Hartz showed the Captain on the radar the danger bearing and distances that he had set up to inform the Captain of the vessel's position relative to the shoal water. Captain Hartz also showed him the vessel's position on the DGPS. When the distance showing 1200 feet from the bow approached the danger bearing, the Captain walked over the engine telegraph, stopped the engine, and then moved the telegraph to half, then full, astern. The Captain also ordered midships rudder. During this backing bell, the vessel did not back strongly to port, and the vessel's heading was in a west-northwest direction.

The Captain continued on the astern bell until the vessel gathered sternway

and the distance from the shoal water increased. Once the vessel had sternway, the Captain moved the telegraph to stop, ordered hard starboard rudder, and then he moved the telegraph to slow ahead. The vessel was slowly swinging to the right. After being on slow ahead for a few moments and seeing the vessel's rate of turn was slow, the Captain moved the telegraph to half ahead. The Captain then asked Captain Hartz about what heading would be needed in order to get out of the anchorage. Captain Hartz told him the heading should be at least 055 degrees. The vessel's heading at this time was northwesterly.

The Captain and Captain Hartz continued to monitor the vessel's distance to the shoal on the radar and the DGPS. When the distance showing 1200 feet from the bow approached the danger bearing, the Captain did not stop the engine. Captain Hartz waited a few moments and when the M/V NOMAR's distance had come just inside 1200 feet, Captain Hartz advised the Captain that he should come astern. The Captain did not respond to Captain Hartz and continued on half ahead. When the vessel's distance to the danger bearing was between the 1200 and the 600 feet range, Captain Hartz repeated to the Captain that he needed to come astern. Again, the Captain did not change the engine order. Once the distance to the danger bearing was closing to 600 feet, Captain Hartz very emphatically told the Captain that he needed to come astern now. The Captain stopped the engine and put the vessel full astern.

The M/V NOMAR was on full astern for approximately 2 minutes before the bow went aground. When the bow grounded, the vessel's speed over the bottom was almost zero and the M/V NOMAR gently came to a stop. Once the M/V NOMAR was stopped, Captain Hartz immediately called the United States Coast Guard to notify them of the grounding. The time was approximately 0550. Captain Hartz checked the position and was confident that the bow was clear of the Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel.

The vessel's echo sounder was midship and reported 16 feet, 3 inches under the keel. The mate on the bow reported that the bow was in 37 feet, 9 inches of water. The full astern bell continued for another 10 minutes to free the vessel. Since the vessel was unable to free herself, Captain Hartz contacted the vessel's agent to arrange for tug assistance.

The agent arranged for the tugs NANCY McALLISTER (NANCY) and the G. M. McALLISTER (G.M.) to come out and assist the M/V NOMAR. The first attempt Captain Hartz made to free the vessel was by having the two tugs make up on either bow on the main deck. The tugs made up in headlines with the bows of the tugs facing the vessel's stern. The G.M. was on the port bow, and the NANCY was on the starboard

bow. Captain Hartz had the tugs work up to full speed ahead while the vessel was full astern, but the M/V NOMAR did not move. Captain Hartz then dropped the NANCY from the starboard bow and moved her to the port quarter. Captain Hartz had the NANCY come ahead full on the port quarter while the vessel continued on full astern and the G.M. continued working on her headline. This swung the bow of the vessel to port away from the shoal and the vessel backed free. Captain Hartz and the Captain were directed to return the M/V NOMAR to the "F" anchorage by the Coast Guard.

Once the vessel was clear of the shoal, Captain Hartz had the tugs assist him in turning the M/V NOMAR around to proceed back to the "F" anchorage. Captain Hartz kept the tugs on station until anchored. During this time the Captain was not on the bridge and Captain Hartz directed the full movement of the M/V NOMAR.

After finishing with anchoring and the Coast Guard, Captain Hartz disembarked the M/V NOMAR and returned to the Pilot Office. Captain Hartz immediately took a state and federal drug test. The M/V NOMAR was inspected by divers and a class surveyor and was determined to be free of damage. The vessel was cleared by the Coast Guard to sail and proceeded to sea that same evening.

Mr. Stone moved that the letter be filed and that the Board take no action as there appears to be no violation of the Board's rules, regulations, or statutes. Mr. Cherry seconded the motion which was unanimously approved by Messrs. and Captains: Callis, Cherry, Cofer, Edmunds, Hasler, Massenburg, McCrory, Spratley, and Stone.

The Board reviewed a letter from Captain J. W. Whiting Chisman dated April 16, 2003, regarding an incident involving the M/V APL ALMANDINE.

Captain J. W.
Whiting Chisman -
M/V APL
ALMANDINE

On Monday, April 14, 2003, Captain Chisman was ordered to the inbound M/V APL ALMANDINE from Cape Henry to Portsmouth Marine Terminal Berth A, port side to, stern at the 200 feet mark. Captain Chisman boarded the vessel at approximately 2030. The draft of the vessel was 29 feet, 8 inches forward and 36 feet, 10 inches aft. The length of the vessel was 946 feet and the width was 106 feet. There was one knot of flood current and the winds were southeasterly at 10 to 15 knots.

The docking master was picked up at approximately 2220 abeam of Lamberts Point Coal pier. The docking master was Captain Charlie

Roughton. His assist tugs were the MARK McALLISTER and the G. M. McALLISTER. The current was then ebbing at 0.4 knots at the Seaboard Coast Line RR, Pinner Point station. The wind was approximately 10-12 knots southeast in Port Norfolk Reach. Captain Roughton relieved Captain Chisman and took the conn at Lamberts Bend. Captain Chisman told him the draft was 36 feet, 10 inches aft and that the vessel was on a dead slow ahead bell and that its speed was approximately 6 knots. Captain Chisman told him that the vessel had a working 2300 horsepower bow thruster. Captain Chisman discussed the condition of the current with Captain Roughton and commented that it was ebbing strongly. Captain Roughton commented that these vessels had a high speed for the "dead slow ahead" bell. Captain Chisman concurred and showed him on the pilot card that, loaded, the vessel's speed for dead slow ahead was 7 knots.

Captain Roughton stopped the engine after turning into Port Norfolk Reach. The tug G.M. McALLISTER was made fast with a line on the starboard quarter and the MARK McALLISTER was on the starboard bow with no line. As the vessel approached the entrance to Portsmouth Marine Terminal at approximately 2235, Captain Roughton ordered half astern. At this time the vessel's speed was approximately 4 knots. The vessel began to swing to starboard as the vessel began its turn into the entrance channel. The vessel's speed was decreasing and the vessel was under control. As approximately 2/3 of the vessel was in the entrance channel, Captain Roughton stopped the engine. The vessel's speed was approximately 1.6 knots. After a couple of minutes, Captain Roughton ordered the rudder hard to starboard and ordered the engine dead slow ahead. The vessel's speed picked up to approximately 3.5 knots. Captain Roughton stopped the engine at approximately 2243. The vessel continued towards the pier at approximately a 60 degree angle. At 2245, Captain Roughton ordered half astern and then quickly through full astern to emergency full astern at 2247. Captain Roughton then ordered the starboard anchor let go at 2247 and held at 2 shots. The vessel approached the pier at a 45 degree angle. To the best of Captain Chisman's knowledge, the stem of the vessel never touched the pier. However, the bulbous bow protrudes from the stem approximately 5-7 meters and the bulbous bow dismantled a two piling fender and could have gone farther under the pier.

After the vessel stopped, the vessel backed away, picked up the starboard anchor and docked port side to finishing at approximately 2320.

Mr. Spratley moved that the letter be filed and that the Board take no action as there appears to be no violation of the Board's rules, regulations,

or statutes. Mr. Stone seconded the motion which was unanimously approved by Messrs. and Captains: Callis, Cherry, Cofer, Edmunds, Hasler, Massenburg, McCrory, Spratley, and Stone.

The Board reviewed a letter from Captain Frank Rabena dated May 1, 2003, regarding an incident involving the M/V RICKMERS SHANGHAI.

Captain Frank
Rabena - M/V
RICKMERS
SHANGHAI

On April 27, 2003, at 1240 hours, Captain Rabena boarded the M/V RICKMERS SHANGHAI at Newport News Marine Terminal. The vessel's length overall is 192.9 meters; molded breadth is 27.8 meters; molded depth is 15.5 meters, draft at time of departure was 28 feet, 8 inches; and the deadweight tonnage is 30,035 tons. The wind was light, coming from the northeast at approximately 10 knots. The weather conditions and visibility were good.

Captain Rabena reported to the bridge of the vessel where he met Captain Tadeusz Kubiszewski, the master, and Captain Roger Warren, the docking master for Krause Towing. The vessel was set to sail at 1300 hours from the north side of Pier C to Cape Henry. The vessel was moored port side to the pier with the stern inshore. Captain Rabena conducted a Master/Pilot exchange of information. According to the master, all of the vessel's gear was working properly. Captain Rabena then spoke with Captain Warren about the state of the current, which was predicted to be maximum ebb at 1307 hours. Captain Rabena contacted the Joint Harbor Operations Center tower and received permission to transit.

The vessel was fitted with a right handed turning, fixed pitch propeller. The vessel is equipped with a 21,168 horsepower main engine and a 1,206 horsepower bow thruster. In a loaded condition, dead slow ahead is equivalent to 32 RPM and 6 knots; slow ahead is equivalent to 48 RPM and 8 knots, half ahead is equivalent to 55 RPM and 11 knots; and full ahead is equivalent to 69 RPM and 13.5 knots. Full astern power is 100% of full ahead power.

At 1300 hours, the single screw, 1,950 horsepower conventional style tugboat ELIZABETH KRAUSE was made fast with a headline on the starboard quarter, just aft of the house. The master, Captain Warren, and Captain Rabena moved to the port bridge wing. Captain Warren gave the order to single up the mooring lines. At approximately 1305 hours, Captain Rabena moved inside the bridge and conducted a security call on channel 13. Captain Rabena stood by the radio for a few minutes to see if any traffic responded. Captain Rabena saw no traffic in the immediate vicinity and he heard no response on channel 13, so he returned to the port bridge wing at approximately 1308 hours where Captain Warren and the

master were standing around the console.

At this point, all of the mooring lines were taken in and the bow was approximately 50 feet away from the dock and continually being thrust, with full power, away from the dock. The stern was approximately 10 feet away from the dock. The vessel was moving forward. Captain Warren ordered the rudder hard to port and the engine to slow ahead. Almost immediately, the stern of the vessel moved away from the pier and the bow stayed approximately 75 feet from the pier. As the engine RPM's increased, the stern moved farther from the pier, and the bow moved closer to the pier. The vessel's speed over the ground increased. Captain Warren ordered the rudder to midship and the engine to dead slow ahead. The bow thruster was still thrusting full to starboard. The vessel's heading steadied, parallel to the pier. The vessel was approximately 50 feet from the pier. Shortly thereafter, the stern began moving closer to the pier. The master commented on the inefficiency of the tugboat. At approximately 1310 hours, the tugboat left the starboard quarter and headed around the bow of the vessel toward the northwest corner of Pier C. At no time did Captain Rabena hear any commands given to the tugboat. Captain Warren ordered the rudder hard to port and the engine to slow ahead; the master repeated the order as if he was in doubt of its purpose. As the bow of the vessel passed by the offshore corner of Pier B and into the ebb current, the vessel turned to port and was headed for the offshore container crane on the northwest corner of Pier C and closing in distance toward the pier.

At approximately 1312 hours, Captain Rabena heard Captain Warren express disappointment. In an attempt to land the vessel's port side parallel to the pier, Captain Rabena took over the conn by turning to the master and ordering the engine half astern and the rudder to midship. The master repeated Captain Rabena's engine and helm order. While still under headway, the vessel pivoted to starboard. The port side of the vessel, aft of the bow flare, came in contact with the pier. No contact was made with the offshore container crane. The bow passed the northwest corner of Pier C, and the vessel was now fully exposed to the ebb current. As the vessel's pivot point approached the corner of the pier, Captain Rabena ordered the engine stopped, the rudder hard to port, and the engine full ahead. The vessel moved laterally and longitudinally away from the pier and out into the river. Once the vessel was far enough from the pier, at approximately 1315 hours, Captain Rabena ordered the engine to dead slow ahead.

At approximately 1320 hours, when the vessel was in the channel, Captain Warren disembarked from the vessel on the Krause tug. As soon as

conditions permitted, Captain Rabena notified the United States Coast Guard via cellular phone about the incident. Captain Rabena then notified the Virginia Pilot Association dispatcher and the local agent with T. Parker Host. Thirty minutes later, the Coast Guard called Captain Rabena on his cell phone and ordered the vessel to anchor at Lynnhaven. The Coast Guard released the vessel after the classification surveyor inspected the damage and talked with the master. Captain Rabena returned to the vessel at approximately 1730 hours and the vessel proceeded to Cape Henry.

Mr. Cherry moved that the letter be filed and that the Board take no action as there appears to be no violation of the Board's rules, regulations, or statutes. Judge Massenburg seconded the motion which was unanimously approved by Messrs. and Captains: Callis, Cherry, Cofer, Edmunds, Hasler, Massenburg, McCrory, Spratley, and Stone.

Captain Callis provided the Board with a report of the examinations conducted by the Examination Administrators on Monday, May 5, 2003. The following report was made:

Examination
Administrators
Report

Chadwick M. Jamison

Captain Jamison answered several oral questions related to the raise in grade. The subjects included anchoring techniques and positions in Newport News, Sewell's Point and Lynnhaven, safe speed in Norfolk Harbor Reach, docking and undocking situations, interaction with docking masters, fatigue, and master/pilot exchange of information. Captain Jamison stood a good examination and was found to be qualified. Captain Callis moved that Captain Jamison be raised from the Alpha classification (200 ship units and a maximum draft of 23 feet or 125 ship units and a maximum draft of 25 feet) to the Bravo classification (300 ship units and a maximum draft of 25 feet or 225 ship units and a maximum draft of 27 feet). Mr. Cherry seconded the motion which was unanimously approved by Messrs. and Captains: Callis, Cherry, Cofer, Edmunds, Hasler, Massenburg, McCrory, Spratley, and Stone.

Charles I. Boggs

Captain Boggs answered several oral questions related to the raise in grade. The subjects included speed of deep loaded vessels, transiting the harbor in deep loaded vessels, anchoring deep draft vessels in Lynnhaven and Sewell's Point Anchorages, and the effects of deep draft vessels in overtaking situations. Captain Boggs stood a good examination and was found to be qualified. Captain Callis moved that Captain Boggs be raised

from the Golf classification (625 ship units and a maximum draft of 38 feet or 450 ship units and a maximum draft of 42 feet) to the Hotel classification (725 ship units and a maximum draft of 41 feet or 550 ship units and a maximum draft of 45 feet). Mr. Cherry seconded the motion which was unanimously approved by Messrs. and Captains: Callis, Cherry, Cofer, Edmunds, Hasler, Massenburg, McCrory, Spratley, and Stone.

Kevin D. Hartz

Captain Hartz answered several oral questions related to the raise in grade. The subjects included speed of deep loaded vessels, transiting the harbor in deep loaded vessels, anchoring deep draft vessels in Lynnhaven and Sewell's Point Anchorages, and the effects of deep draft vessels in overtaking situations. Captain Hartz stood a good examination and was found to be qualified. Captain Callis moved that Captain Hartz be raised from the Golf classification (625 ship units and a maximum draft of 38 feet or 450 ship units and a maximum draft of 42 feet) to the Hotel classification (725 ship units and a maximum draft of 41 feet or 550 ship units and a maximum draft of 45 feet). Mr. Cherry seconded the motion which was unanimously approved by Messrs. and Captains: Callis, Cherry, Cofer, Edmunds, Hasler, Massenburg, McCrory, Spratley, and Stone.

Mr. Spratley moved to adopt the following resolution in memory of former Board member Captain Douglas C. Broad.

Adoption of
Resolution

RESOLUTION IN MEMORY OF

Captain Douglas C. Broad

WHEREAS, **Douglas C. Broad** faithfully and diligently served as a member of the Virginia Board for Branch Pilots from 1967 to 1991; and

WHEREAS, **Douglas C. Broad** devoted generously of his time, talent and leadership to the Board; and

WHEREAS, **Douglas C. Broad** endeavored at all times to render decisions with fairness and good judgment in the best interest of the citizens of the Commonwealth and this profession; and

WHEREAS, the Virginia Board for Branch Pilots is grateful for **Douglas C. Broad's** dedication and service to the Board and to the citizens of the Commonwealth; and

WHEREAS, the Virginia Board for Branch Pilots mourns the death of **Douglas C. Broad**, which occurred on March 31, 2003;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, this fifth day of May, 2003, that the Virginia Board for Branch Pilots expresses utmost regard and respect for **Douglas C. Broad** and this professional legacy; and, so that all may know of the Board's depth of sorrow and its expression of sympathy, it is ordered this resolution be spread upon the official minutes of the Board and that a copy hereof be presented to the family of **Douglas C. Broad**.

Captain Callis seconded the motion which was unanimously approved by Messrs. and Captains: Callis, Cherry, Cofer, Edmunds, Hasler, Massenburg, McCrory, Spratley, and Stone.

The Board members directed staff to contact Mrs. Broad and invite her to the Board's next meeting scheduled for August 1, 2003, so that the Board may present her with the resolution.

Mr. Courtney advised the Board that House Bill 2131 had been signed by the Governor and will become effective July 1, 2003. This bill provides an exemption in the Freedom of Information Act for records of the Board relating to the chemical or drug testing of a person regulated by the Board, where such person has tested negative or has not been the subject of a disciplinary action by the Board for a positive test result.

Legislative Update

Mr. Cherry indicated that he had recently seen several different titles for Mr. Courtney and asked for clarification. Mr. Courtney explained that his titled recently changed to "Executive Director."

Other Business

Captain Callis presented to Judge Massenburg an identification card from the July 1948 Democratic National Convention that belonged to Judge Massenburg's father.

Mr. Courtney reminded the Board members that they had previously agreed to reduce their per diem amounts to fund Mr. Zorn's travel for the current fiscal year. As this would be the Board's last meeting before the start of the new fiscal year, Mr. Courtney informed the Board that the


Department's financial position had not improved and inquired whether the Board wished to continue its current funding arrangement for the upcoming fiscal year. Mr. Zorn indicated that no action was necessary by the Board as the Attorney General was resolving this issue. Ms. Ware stated that she was not aware of any resolution to this matter.

Conflict of Interest forms were completed by all members present.


Conflict of Interest
Forms

There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 10:45 a.m.

Adjourn



Robert T. Hasler, Jr., President



Louise Fontaine Ware, Secretary

COPY TESTE:

Custodian of Records

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CONFLICT OF INTEREST ACT

TRANSACTIONAL DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
for Officers and Employees of State Government

1. Name: Robert H. Callis, III
2. Title: Member
3. Agency: Board for Branch Pilots
4. Transaction: Board Meeting on May 5, 2003
5. Nature of Personal Interest Affected by Transaction: _____

6. I declare that:

(a) I am a member of the following business, profession, occupation or group, the members of which are affected by the transaction:

(b) I am able to participate in this transaction fairly, objectively, and in the public interest.

Robert H. Callis, III
Signature

5/5/03
Date

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CONFLICT OF INTEREST ACT

TRANSACTIONAL DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
for Officers and Employees of State Government

1. Name: Bruce R. Cherry
2. Title: Member
3. Agency: Board for Branch Pilots
4. Transaction: Board Meeting on May 5, 2003
5. Nature of Personal Interest Affected by Transaction: NONE

6. I declare that:

(a) I am a member of the following business, profession, occupation or group, the members of which are affected by the transaction:

NONE

(b) I am able to participate in this transaction fairly, objectively, and in the public interest.

Bruce R. Cherry
Signature

5/5/03
Date

**STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CONFLICT OF INTEREST ACT**

**TRANSACTIONAL DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
for Officers and Employees of State Government**

1. Name: Milton B. Edmunds
2. Title: Member
3. Agency: Board for Branch Pilots
4. Transaction: Board Meeting on May 5, 2003
5. Nature of Personal Interest Affected by Transaction: _____

6. I declare that:

(a) I am a member of the following business, profession, occupation or group, the members of which are affected by the transaction:

(b) I am able to participate in this transaction fairly, objectively, and in the public interest.

M B Edmunds
Signature

5/5/03
Date

**STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CONFLICT OF INTEREST ACT**

**TRANSACTIONAL DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
for Officers and Employees of State Government**

1. Name: Robert T. Hasler, Jr.
2. Title: Member
3. Agency: Board for Branch Pilots
4. Transaction: Board Meeting on May 5, 2003
5. Nature of Personal Interest Affected by Transaction: _____

6. I declare that:

(a) I am a member of the following business, profession, occupation or group, the members of which are affected by the transaction:

(b) I am able to participate in this transaction fairly, objectively, and in the public interest.



Signature

May 5, 2003

Date

**STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CONFLICT OF INTEREST ACT**

**TRANSACTIONAL DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
for Officers and Employees of State Government**

1. Name: Edgar A. Massenburg
2. Title: Member
3. Agency: Board for Branch Pilots
4. Transaction: Board Meeting on May 5, 2003
5. Nature of Personal Interest Affected by Transaction: _____

None

6. I declare that:

(a) I am a member of the following business, profession, occupation or group, the members of which are affected by the transaction:

None

(b) I am able to participate in this transaction fairly, objectively, and in the public interest.

Edgar Massenburg

Signature

5/5/03

Date

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CONFLICT OF INTEREST ACT

TRANSACTIONAL DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
for Officers and Employees of State Government

1. Name: W. Hugh McCrory, Jr.
2. Title: Member
3. Agency: Board for Branch Pilots
4. Transaction: Board Meeting on May 5, 2003
5. Nature of Personal Interest Affected by Transaction: _____

6. I declare that:

(a) I am a member of the following business, profession, occupation or group, the members of which are affected by the transaction:
VIRGINIA PILOT ASSOC.

(b) I am able to participate in this transaction fairly, objectively, and in the public interest.

W. Hugh McCrory, Jr.
Signature

5/5/03
Date

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CONFLICT OF INTEREST ACT

TRANSACTIONAL DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
for Officers and Employees of State Government

1. Name: P. Warren Spratley, Jr.
2. Title: Member
3. Agency: Board for Branch Pilots
4. Transaction: Board Meeting on May 5, 2003
5. Nature of Personal Interest Affected by Transaction: None

6. I declare that:

(a) I am a member of the following business, profession, occupation or group, the members of which are affected by the transaction:

(b) I am able to participate in this transaction fairly, objectively, and in the public interest.

P. Warren Spratley, Jr.
Signature

5/5/03
Date

**STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CONFLICT OF INTEREST ACT**

**TRANSACTIONAL DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
for Officers and Employees of State Government**


1. Name: Meade G. Stone, Jr.
 2. Title: Member
 3. Agency: Board for Branch Pilots
 4. Transaction: Board Meeting on May 5, 2003
 5. Nature of Personal Interest Affected by Transaction: NONE
-

6. I declare that:

(a) I am a member of the following business, profession, occupation or group, the members of which are affected by the transaction:

NONE

(b) I am able to participate in this transaction fairly, objectively, and in the public interest.


Signature

5-5-03
Date